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SHALL IT BE SAID THAT MY DUSK WAS IN TRUTH MY
DAWN?*'WHAT STATES CAN GLEAM FROM THE ENvIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF DEREGULATING ELECTRICITY IN

CALIFORNIA
MICHAEL KANTROt

I. INTRODUCTION

In 1996, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
promulgated Rule 888,1 which mandated the deregulation and
restructuring of the United States electric utility industry. Since the
promulgation of Rule 888, states have been struggling to restructure their
electric utility industries.2 What makes deregulation a difficult
environmental issue is that it has uncertain environmental and economic
3 While FERC predicts that the consequences will be
consequences.
4
"minimal,' it may have underestimated harmful environmental impacts
that could be caused by restructuring. 5 This paper will look to California,
one of the first states to pass a significant deregulation bill, 6 to see what
*

KAHLIL GIBRAN, THE PROPHET 6 (1923). [The use of the word "Gleam" in the title is

intended to be a pun-Eds.]
t Michael Kantro is a third-year student at the Marshall-Wythe School of Law at the
College of William and Mary. He would like to thank Professor Charles Koch, who
helped inspire this article, and Liam McCann and Heather Phillips for reading and editing
the article and providing helpful advice.
I Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory
Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities
and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21540 (May 10, 1996) (hereinafter Rule 888).
2 As of 1999, only seventeen states have begun retail competition. Suedeen G. Kelly, The
New Electric Powerhouses: Will They Transform Your Life?, 29 ENVTL. L. 285 (1999).

3 See Ann Berwick, Environmental Implications of Energy Industry Restructuring, 33

NEW ENG. L. REV. 619, 619 (1999) (conceding that predicting of the environmental
consequences of deregulation was necessarily "guess work").
4 EPA Wants Utilities to Prevent More Air Pollution After Deregulation,
ENERGY
REPORT, Monday, Feb. 26, 1996, available at 1996 WL 8375585.
5 See id.
6 See David G. Pettinari, Comment, You Can't Always Get What You Want - Will Two

Recent State Court Decisions Tarnish the Political Promise of Electricity Industry
Deregulation?,76 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 501 (1999), which describes California as one
of the "pioneer states" for completely deregulating by 1998.
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environmental lessons other states can learn from California's attempt at
deregulation.
In Part II, this paper will examine the history of electric utility
deregulation nationally. In Part III, this paper will discuss the possible
environmental consequences of deregulation on a national scale. In Part
IV, this paper will examine the history of the restructuring effort in
California. In Part V, this paper will analyze the effects of California
restructuring on the environment. It will look at the market that has
developed after restructuring and assess the effectiveness of the public
policy programs California has implemented to protect the environment.
It will examine subsidies, mandatory labeling, and command-and-control
measures. This paper will point out the limits of market based protections
and particularly note their failure to protect the poor. It will examine
whether the "green energy ' 7 marketed in the California market is actually
green. This paper will also examine the complex hybrid structure
California implemented and look at how that structure aids in creating a
renewable energy market. Finally, this paper will conclude by describing
the environmental lessons other states can learn from the California
restructuring experience.

II. DEREGULATION NATIONALLY
In order to understand the movement to deregulate electrical
utilities, it helps to understand why utilities were regulated in the first
place. When Thomas Edison opened the first major electricity generation
plant on September 4, 1882, he began what quickly became a highly
competitive industry.8 The industry followed a predictable pattern of
growth, expanding to over thirty-seven hundred utilities, 9 followed by
concentration. 10
Eventually, by the mid-1920s, sixteen companies
controlled 85 percent of the electricity market."
As huge electricity trusts developed, consumers became concerned
that electric utility owners were gouging consumers by setting unreason-

7 Green energy and renewable energy are used synonymously for the purposes of this
faper.
See Joseph P. Tomain, Electricity Restructuring: A Case Study in Government
Regulation, 33 TULSA L.J. 827, 830 (1998).
9 See
10

id.

Seeid.

See id.
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ably high prices.12 States began to regulate through Public Utility
Commissions (PUCs) to reduce electricity prices.' 3 The justification for
regulation was found in the structure of electric utilities. Electric utilities
are often described as having three structural components-generation,
transmission and distribution.
Electric utilities have traditionally been
vertically integrated, having one owner control all three functions. 15
Because of the high costs of entry, utilities experienced economies
of scale, where "one large utility can produce and sell electricity more
cheaply than could a number of small producers."' 16 The economies of
scale were exacerbated by vertical integration.' 7 These economic
conditions lead policy makers to categorize electricity generation as a
"natural monopoly" I where "one firm can more efficiently deliver a
product at a lower cost than multiple firms." 19 The government allowed a
legal monopoly in order to gain the efficiencies of the economies of scale
and set prices through regulation in order to avoid the high prices of a
20
monopoly.
As part of the compensation for governmental regulation, the
government allowed utilities to earn a reasonable return on prudent capital
investments. 21 Natural monopolies pose significant public policy
problems. 22 While a single firm or producer is structurally able to provide
the lowest costs, that firm has the incentives of a monopoly and may
12 PETER NAVARRO, THE DIMMING OF AMERICA

4 (1985). See also Tomain, supra note
8, at 830-31 (arguing that consumers were concerned with more than just the high prices,
but also by the cause of the high prices. "The electric trusts, like the oil trusts before
them, were susceptible to stock manipulation and shareholder abuses... [and] the public
reacted sharply to the electricity trusts and the electricity industry came under scrutiny by
state and federal politicians.").
13 See NAVARRO, supra note 12, at 4-5.
14PAUL L. JOSKOW AND RICHARD SCHMALENSEE,
MARKETS FOR POWER: AN ANALYSIS

OF ELECTRIC UTILITY DEREGULATION 25
15 See id.
16 LEONARD

S.

4" ed. 1992).

(1983).

HYMAN, AMERICA'S ELECTRIC UTILITIES: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE

4

7 See JOSKOW, supra note 14, at 25 (making the argument that "it
would be wrong to
assume that these three segments can be operated independently from one another, by
separate fims coordinating their activities.., without any loss in economic efficiency").
18 See id. at 29.
19 See Tomain, supra note 8, at 832.
20 See JOSKOW, supra note 14, at 30-31.
21 See Tomain, supra note 8, at 832.
22 See JOSKOW, supra note 14, at 30.
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artificially inflate prices.2 3 Regulating a monopoly is a difficult task,
however, as regulations can "provide incentives for inefficiency" by
persistently
allowing utility earnings which are either too high or too
24
low.
The efficiency of regulation began to fall apart in the 1960s, when
the high costs of the Vietnam War and large amounts of social spending
resulted in increased inflation and increasing electric utility costs. 25 In
addition, the passage of the Clean Air Act in 1972 increased costs as much
as twenty-five percent. 26 Many Northeast utilities shifted from coal
burning plants to oil fueled plants to comply with the Clean Air Act. 27 As
a response to the oil crisis, utilities began to shift resources to nuclear
power. 28 Nuclear power became less attractive and cost-effective after the
Three Mile Island disaster in 1979.29
The Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) increased the environmental and safety standards for
nuclear power plants, resulting in increased costs. 30 These economic
conditions
"put great pressure on utilities to raise prices at unprecedented
31
rates."
While utility owners were frustrated by decreased profits,
consumers were frustrated by the price increases. 32 Despite public
23

See id. Richard A. Posner described the relationship between utilities to regulators in a

regulated monopoly as "manipulative," in which the regulated firm have a perverse
incentive to "[hide] profits in costs, for example by purchasing supplies from wholly
owned but unregulated subsidiaries at inflated prices that can be covered in its allowed
rates." Richard A. Posner, The Effects of Deregulationon Competition: The Experience
of the UnitedStates, 23-Symposium FORDHAM INT'L L.J. S7, S 10 (2000).
24 JOSKOW, supra note 14, at 31. In addition, regulation provided incentives for

inefficient investment in generation facilitates because it "encouraged utilities to build
large, long-lived generating stations that took a decade or more to construct" and over

that decade, utilities would be unable to take advantage of new technology. See HYMAN,
supra note 16, at 327.
See NAVARRO, supra note 12, at 7.
26 See id. at 8.
27 See id.
28 See id.

29 On March 28, 1979 a cooling system malfunction resulted in the first major nuclear
accident in America. See

HYMAN,

supra note 16, at 136-7. Consumers and investors lost

confidence in nuclear power. After the accident "even proponents of the nuclear effort
seemed to be thinking more in terms of finishing what was already under construction

[rather] than planning for additional facilities." Id. at 137. No new plants were ordered.
See id. at 33.
30 NAVARRO, supra note 12, at 10.
31 Tomain, supra note 8, at 834.
32 See NAVARRO, supra note 12, at 10.
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frustrations, PUCs were obliged to allow utilities some profit and were,
therefore, forced to increase electricity prices. The public frustration did
lead the PUCs, however, to increase rates much more slowly than the
increased costs. 33 This rate suppression provided utilities
with perverse
34
incentives to forgo economically sound investments.
The rapid increases in costs in the United States electricity market,
concerns about energy conservation, and the belief that the use of
environmentally efficient technologies might be commercially viable
combined to create a political environment willing to allow increased
competition in the electric utility industry.35 In response to these
concerns, Congress passed the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of
1978 (PURPA). 36 PURPA allowed for non-utilities to engage in electrical
37
generation as independent power producers, or qualifying facilities.
PURPA had the specific goal of encouraging the development of
alternative electricity sources.

39
Many of these qualifying facilities were efficient and profitable.
However, in order for qualifying facilities to get their energy to the
market, they needed to use the transmission lines, which were still a
monopoly owned by the utilities.40 As qualifying facilities became more
successful they demanded access to a wider market through the national
transmission lines. 4 ' PURPA gave FERC the power to, under some
circumstances, force electrical utilities to allow these new competitors to
42
use transmission facilities.

33 See id. at 9.
34See id. at
12.
35See Rudy Perkins, Note, Electricity Deregulation,EnvironmentalExternalities
and the
Limitations of Price, 39 B.C. L. REV. 993, 997 (1998).
36 Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978).
37 PURPA allowed these independent power operators to sell their power
to utilities at
"avoided" cost. PURPA § 210. Avoided cost was the "utility's estimated cost of
generating the equivalent amount of power by building new baseload capacity," not the
actual market value of the electricity. See Michael Evan Stem & Margaret M. Mlynczak
Stem, A Critical Overview of the Economic and Environmental Consequences of the
Deregulation of the US. Electric Power Industry, 4 ENVTL. LAW. 79, 87 (1997)
thereinafter CriticalOverview], available at WL 4 ENVTLAW 79.
8 Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act § 2.
39See Tomain, supra note 8, at 835.
40 See CriticalOverview, supra note
37, at 90.
41 See Id.

42 Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act § 203
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In 1992, Congress moved one step closer to electric competition by
passing the federal Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct), which removed
some regulatory burdens from qualifying facilities and allowed increased
access to transmission lines.4a The EPAct was designed to slow the rise of
American oil imports, conserve energy, encourage efficiency, provide new
energy options and more diverse supplies, develop renewable energy
resources, increase competition in the electric industry, and address global
warming. 4
The success of qualifying facilities has lead to the conclusion that
electrical generation no longer experiences economies of scale or is
hampered by high costs of entry, and is, therefore, no longer a "natural
monopoly.' ' 5 This conclusion helped lead to deregulation 46 in part
because economists already believed it was possible to separate the
components of a natural monopoly. 47 This theory was tested with
telephone deregulation.4 8 Called the "Bell doctrine," this theory posits
that where a regulated industry nonetheless results in monopolistic
characteristics, the appropriate response is to "quarantine" the
monopolistic section of the industry and allow competition in other
areas.49
Rule 888 was an attempt to quarantine generation from
transmission and distribution.50 It envisioned an independent systems
operator to control the transmission lines and ensure non-discriminatory
open access to transmission lines in order to assure competition.51 FERC
needed to decide how to deal with the politically difficult issue of stranded
costs, "the costs prudently incurred by the local utilities that will not be
43 See Perkins, supra note 35, at 1009.
4H. R. REP. No. 102-474, pt. 1, at 133 (1992).

supra note 16, at 165-66 ("Today, the generating sector of the electric utility
industry no longer seems to exhibit economies of scale, and may be ripe for control by

45HYMAN,

means of competition instead of regulation.").
46 See Tomain, supra note 8, at 840. See also Andrew Noceto et al., Agency Action:
Business Regulatory Agency, 16-WTR Cal. Reg. L. Rep. 158, 158 (1999), available at

WL 16-WTR CARLR 158.

See Noceto, supra note 46.

48 See id.
49 Paul L. Joskow & Roger G. Noll, The Bell Doctrine: Applications in Tele-

communications,Electricity, and Other Network Industries, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1250
(1999). In the case of Telecommunications, this theory suggested that AT&T and GTE

used monopolistic tendencies of local telephone lines to dominate a long-distance
industry that could otherwise be competitive. See id.
5o See Rule 888, supra note 3.
51 See id. at 21565.
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recoverable through market-determined prices, and that result from the
utilities' reliance on the previous regulatory structure."52 Rule 888 dealt
with stranded costs by endorsing the view that utilities
should recover
53
costs."
stranded
verifiable
and
prudent
"legitimate,
Rule 888 was met with both praise and criticism: proponents of the
rule stressed that competition would result in lower rates and increased
efficiency,54 while critics believed that deregulation would pose a threat to
the environment."
Critics also worried that the poor would bear an
inordinate burden of both the economic and environmental costs of
deregulation. 56 To allay fears that deregulation would pose a threat to the
environment, FERC wrote an Environmental Impact Report (EIR). In this
report, FERC conceded that the rule would have a negative impact if the
industry favored coal, but argued that deregulation would have a positive
impact if the industry favored natural gas, and concluded that "any
negative impacts that the rule might cause are a small fraction of the
uncertainty inherent in fuel price projections. 57
52 Indianapolis Power & Light Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 711 A.2d 1071,

1074 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998).

53 Supra note 3, at 21540.

Critical Overview, supra note 37, at 101 ("In theory, the dismemberment of the
traditional electric utility system... will lead to the dynamism of a truly competitive
market in electricity, which is both economically and environmentally efficient."). But
see id. at 104-5 (arguing that "if 'economic efficiency' connotes the lowest price,
deregulation proponents must properly define that price to include all consequences
attendant to the proposed alternations to the existing system of electric power
eneration").
Critics argued that deregulation of electric utilities would lead to increased emissions
of carbon dioxide because competition would lead to more frequent use of older coalfired power plants, increased demand for electricity would result in more use of fossil
fuel for electricity generation, uncertainty would delay the retirement of some older
plants, and restructuring would reduce investment in renewable technology. See Edward
54See

A. Smeloff, Utility Deregulation and Global Warming, the Coming Collision, 12-SPG
NAT. RESOURCES & ENv'T 280 (1998), availableat WL 12-SPG NATRE 280.
56 See Critical Overview, supra note 37, at 111 (stating that "viewed in the very best

light, the nation's failure to provide subsidized electricity will mean that millions of U.S.
citizens could see their standard of living decline to early twentieth century levels"). See
also Stephen M. Johnson, Economics v. Equity: Do Market-Based Environmental
Reforms ExacerbateEnvironmentalInjustice?, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 111, 118 (1999)
(arguing that the market, and market based reforms, "encourage polluters to shift
pollution to lower-income communities").
7Alan Miller & Adam Serchuk, The Promise and Peril in a Restructured Electric
System, 12-FALL Nat. Resources & Env't 118, 119 (1997), available at WL 12-FALL
NATRE 118.
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III. NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) argued publicly that
the FERC EIR was incorrect in assessing potential environmental damage
as "minimal. 58 United States electric utilities have been a major
contributor to global environmental problems.5 9 Electric utilities are a
major source of nitrous oxides, sulfur dioxide and carbon dioxide. 60 In
fact, the EPA estimates that electricity utilities accounted for 36 percent of
carbon dioxide emissions and 25 percent of nitrous oxide emissions in the
United States in 1998.61 Nitrous oxides and sulfur dioxide are a major
cause of acid rain, 62 while carbon dioxide is a significant greenhouse
gas. 63 Old coal plants, which were "grandfathered," so as to be immune to
64
the Clean Air Act, cause most of the damage.
The clash between the EPA and FERC over the EIA was
essentially an argument over the future of these coal plants. 65 The EPA
was skeptical about FERC's assertion that electrical generators would
have no incentive to crank up the use of cost of operating coal-firing
plants because natural gas would remain cheaper than operating coalfiring plants. 66 The EPA was concerned that if FERC was wrong, and
natural gas did not retain a competitive advantage, restructuring would
encourage utilities to increase the use of coal burning plants, and thus
increase pollution. 67 The controversy eventually led to a large political
conflict between the Environmental Protection Agency and FERC. 8
58 See

supra note 4.
59 See RICHARD L.

OTTINGER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS OF ELECTRICITY

13

1990).

oSee id.
United States Environmental Protection Agency, National Air Pollutant Trends 19001998 2-2, 8-3 (2000), at http://www.epa.gov/tti/chief/trends98/emtmd.html.
62 See OTTINGER, supra note 59.
61

63

See id.

64See

Ann Brewster Weeks, Advising Nature: Can We Get Clean Air From the Old

Dirties?, 33 NEW ENG. L. REv. 707, 710-11 (1999). See also Berwick, supra note 3, at
621-2 (arguing that grandfathering means that "Eisenhower era plants" who did not have

to comply with the heightened standards of the Clean Air Act will have "a competitive
edge" in a deregulated market).
65 See
66 See

Miller & Serchuk, supra note 57, at 119.
National Air Pollutant Trends 1900-1998, supra note 61.

67 See id.

Rule 888, Nichols said, "[We at the EPA] don't want them to screw things up."
FERC chair Elizabeth Moler countered, "we have declined the honor of doing EPA's job,
68About

but I don't think we 'screwed it up."' Utilities Not Doing Enough to Protect Public
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In addition to a possible increase in dirty gases released by coal
burning plants, electrical restructuring could have other negative
environmental effects. 69 It could affect the patterns in which nuclear
power plants are used, causing a shift to coal use as nuclear power
becomes less competitive. 70 If nuclear power plants continue to be used,

the public suffers incremental harms from the radioactive waste.71
Shutting down nuclear power plants would cause an entirely different set
of environmental problems, because, if the plants are closed, the
radioactive waste from nuclear power plants will have to be safely isolated
from the environment for at least 10,000 years.72
IV.

RESTRUCTURING IN CALIFORNIA

Pre-restructuring regulatory reform had a "profound" effect on the
California electrical utility industry, in part because of the success of
qualifying facilities. 73 By the 1990s, qualifying facilities in California
increased from a negligible percentage of electricity-generating capacity to
almost 12 percent of dependable capacity in 1991. 74 However, electricity
prices were high. The impetus for reform was the belief that regulation of
the industry caused inflated electricity prices.75

Health, EPA's Nichols Declares, UTIL. ENv'T REP., Nov. 8, 1996 at 1, availableat 1996

WL 13198920. Several senators, including Frank Murkowski, the chairman of the Energy
and Natural Resources Committee, rallied to FERC's defense. The Senators wrote a
letter to FERC in which they argued that the EPA used a "worst-case set of assumptions"
and was attempting to "delegate to sister federal agencies [its] authority." Stand Firm
Against Environmentaliston Restructuring,Senators Tell FERC, ENERGY REPORT, Feb.
26, 1996, availableat 1996 WL 8375587.
69 See Berwick, supra note 3, at 620.
70
See id. at 621.
71 See id. at 620.
72 Nuclear Waste Policy Act: Hearings on ProposedAmendments Before Sen. Comm. Of
Energy and Natural Res., 104th Cong. (Mar. 2, 1995) (statement of Bill Magavern,
Director, Critical Mass Energy Project).
73 Dierdre O'Callaghan & Steve Greewald, PURPA from Coast to Coast: America's
Great Electricity Experiment, 10-WTR NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 17, 20 (1996)
("Implementation of PURPA transformed California's electric infrastructure from a
model of nineteenth century natural monopoly regulation into a vision of a highly
competitive, technology-driven twenty-first century energy services web.").
74 See id.
75See HYMAN, supra note 16, at 330 ("The desire for reform is based on the belief
that
the regulatory system has not worked: it has produced an industry unmindful of costs,
because all costs could be passed on to captive customers.").
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On April 20, 1992, the California Public Utilities Commission
(CPUC) issued a Rulemaking proceeding in order to restructure

California's electric utility industry. 76

The CPUC explored two

possibilities-the first of which was a structure of retail competition that
would allow retail customers to choose among electric suppliers and a
wholesale, pool-oriented structure.7 7 This "poolco" system, like the U.K.

system, would have resulted in a centrally determined wholesale price
based on a winning bid. 78 The debate over whether to implement a

bilateral and pool-oriented trading system was contentious. 79 Eventually,
CPUC negotiated a joint memorandum of understanding with several
major utilities, including giant Southern California Edison. ° This
compromise envisioned a hybrid system that would allow both pool-based
8
and bilateral trading. '
In 1996, the California state legislature passed Assembly Bill
1890, which restructured the California electric utility industry using the
CPUC model.8 2 The Assembly retained transmission as a state-regulated

monopoly, while competition was introduced to electricity generation. 3
In order to facilitate the market, the bill created an oversight board and

authorized the creation of two quasi-public corporations-an Independent
85
Systems Operator (Cal-ISO), 84 and a Power Exchange (PX).
76

CPUC, Electric Restructuringin California:An InformationalReport (1997), (October

21, 1999), at www.cpuc.ca.gov/divisions/Environmental/restruct/open.html [hereinafter
InformationalReport].
A poolco is where there is a centrally determined wholesale price based on
a winning
bid. See Lori M. Rodgers & Joseph F. Schuler, Jr., Ready, Fire,Aim: Californiaand the
Nation on the Eve of Competition, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Jan. 1, 1998, at 26 [hereinafter Eve
jCompetition].
See id.
79See Keith R. McCrea & Gregory K. Lawrence, East and West Coast
Restructuring
Efforts, 12 - SPG NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 243, 244 (1998).
See id. at 244 ("The debate between the Poolco and direct access [bilateral
trading]
advocates had much the fervor of a crusade ...[but] the gulf between the two camps
began to narrow when Southern California Edison .. .negotiated a memorandum of
understanding [with CPUC].").
81 See Eve of Competition, supra note 77, at 26.
82 A.B. 1890, 1996 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996), LEXIS 1996 Cal ALS 854.
83 Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 330 (b).,
84 The ISO was to designed operate the transmission grid in such a way to provide open
access to generators and insure reliability. California Oversight Board, Decision 97-05-1,
Appendix A, Bylaws of the California Independent System Operator Corporation, A
California Non-Profit Benefit Corporation, Article II § 2 (a)-(b) (March 23, 2000) at
http://www.eob.ca.gov/documents/index.htmnl.
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Assembly Bill 1890 was controversial. Proponents argued that the
bill was "unique in its comprehensive approach to restructuring." 86 The
California legislature followed FERC guidelines in Rule 888 and argued
that "prudent" stranded costs should be recoverable.8 7 Moreover, the bill
created a fund to support environmental programs.8 8 CPUC issued a
detailed report arguing that the negative environmental impact of
restructuring would probably be minimal and the overall effect would
89
benefit the environment.
The California legislature clearly viewed the benefits of
restructuring as greater than merely reducing prices, but to "ensure that
California's transition to a more competitive electricity market structure..
• creates a new market structure that provides competitive, low cost and
reliable electric service . . . and preserves California's commitment to
90
developing diverse, environmentally sensitive electricity resources."
Unfortunately, it appears that the legislature was overly optimistic about
price reductions. Over the summer, customers of San Diego Gas and
Electric Co. (SDG&E), the first California customers to pay market
costs
91
for electricity, had their bills spike by two to three hundred percent.
85 The Power Exchange is designed to act as an auction, ensure that the participants
fulfill their obligations and arrange scheduling with the ISO. See California Oversight
Board, Decision 97-05-1, Appendix B, Bylaws of the California Power Exchange
Corporation, A California Non-Profit Benefit Corporation, Article II § 1 (a), (c) and (d),

SMar. 23, 2000) at http://www.eob.ca.gov/documents/index.htrnl.

Keith R. McCrea & Gregory K. Lawrence, East and West Coast RestructuringEfforts,
12 - SPG NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 243, 245 (1998).
87 See supra note 38. California allowed utilities to recover stranded costs through a nonbypassable "competitive transition charge." But see McCrea, supra note 79, at 245
("utilities are at risk for any... stranded costs which they are unable to fully recover by
the end of 2001.").
88 Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 381.
89 See InformationalReport, supra note 76, at Chapter 4.
90 A.B. 1890 § l(a), 1996 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996), LEXIS 1996 Cal ALS 854.
91 Anne C. Mulkem & Mark Katches, Deregulation a failed experiment? Energy:
Consumers have little power in California'scurrent electricity market, ORANGE COUNTY
(CAL.) REG., July 23, 2000, at AO1, available at 2000 WL 4842122. While a hot summer
was certainly a significant cause of the increases, the major problem is that consumption
is increasing by "about two major power plants per year," in part because of a transition
to a computer-based economy. See Nancy Vogel, Californiaand the West Demandfor

Electricity Tests Power-Grid Operator Deregulation: Acting as a traffic cop on the
electron freeway, young agency faces tough task amid shortages, L.A. TIMES, July 6,
2000, at A3, available in 2000 WL 2257914 [hereinafter Vogel]. The crisis got so bad
that on June 14, northern California was hit by rolling blackouts as the ISO ordered
PG&E to cut off power to 97,000 customers. Id. The blackouts were California's "first
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V. THE CALIFORNIA SYSTEM

California's electrical utility industry was in fairly good shape,
environmentally, prior to restructuring. California had very few coal-fired
power plants within its border 92 and imported most of its coal generated
93
fuel from plants in the Southwest owned by California companies.
California has two nuclear power plants-the San Onofre Nuclear
Generating Station in San Diego County94 and the Diablo Canyon Nuclear
Power Plant in San Luis Obispo County.
In 1995, 20 percent of California's power was generated in state by
hydroelectric plants, 14 percent by nuclear power, 7 percent by coal, and
30.5 percent by natural gas. 95 In addition, 18.5 percent of power was
imported from the Pacific Northwest or the Southwest. 96 Between 1991
and 1995 California coal consumption dropped from approximately 9.7
97
percent to 7 percent of the total yearly consumption of electricity.
One of the major environmental concerns of electrical restructuring
in California was the belief that renewable energy may not be
commercially viable and would be unable to survive a deregulated
market. 98 As of 1999, it cost 5.3 cents per kilowatt/hour for renewable
energy, and about 2.5 cents per kilowatt/hour to use coal or oil. 99 Critics

deliberate blackouts since World War II." See Nancy Rivera Brooks, Consumers Seek
Repeal of Utility DeregulationElectricity: Surging bills and shortages have convinced
many that competition isn't working. But a solution is elusive., L. A. TIMES, July 29,

2000, at Al, available at 2000 WL 2264592 [hereinafter Brooks]. The blackouts nearly
knocked out power to ten states. Mulkern & Katches, supra note 91. Things got so bad
that the ISO staff proposed operating a floating power plant from a barge in the San
Francisco Bay. See supra Vogel.
92 This, however, is an example of a negative environmental externality. Because
California does not have to deal with the consequences of the coal-generated pollution
caused by the electricity it imports, California is unlikely to take account of the
environmental damage the coal-fired plants cause to others.
93 See InformationalReport, supra note 76.
94 In addition, several California utilities, including Southern California Edison,
are part

owners of the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station in Arizona. See id.
95See id at table 1-2.
96 See id at table 1-2.
97 See id at table 1-2.
98 See Peter Asmus, Deregulation Means a Clean Power Option for Many Americans,
GREENWIREs, Jan. 1, 2000, availableat 2000 WL 10471102.

99 See Robert D. Hazel, Note, Electric Utility Regulatory Reform: The Demise
of

AlternativeEnergy, 8 S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 137 (1999).
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wondered if renewable energy could survive if consumers were unwilling
to pay added premiums.'0
California decided to set up a fund to subsidize renewable
energy. 01' Theoretically, subsidizing renewable energy will make it
cheaper and thus more competitive with less environmentally-friendly
production methods such as coal.' 0 2 The California renewable energy
fund has a four-year, $540 million budget raised from Southern California
Edison, Pacific Gas and Electric Company, and the San Diego Gas and
Electric Company. 10 3 The fund is organized by the California Energy
Commission, which divided the fund into four accounts-the Existing
Renewable Resources Account ($243 million), the New Renewable
Resources Account ($162 million), the Emerging Renewable Resources
Account (Buy-Down Program-$54 million), and the Consumer-Side
Renewable Resources Account.' °4 One-percent of the budget ($5.4
million) was put aside, 0and
later used for a plan to educate consumers
5
about renewable energy.1
The Existing Renewable Resources Account was designed to help
maintain in-state existing renewable technologies during the first four
years of restructuring. 10 6 It allocates $243 million in subsidies-$135
million to biomass, waste-tire, and solar thermal energy, $70.2 million to
wind, and $37.8 million to geothermal, small hydroelectric digester gas,
landfill gas, and municipal solid waste. 107 Renewable suppliers with
08
eligible generators receive a monthly cents-per-kilowatt-hour payment.'
The New Renewable Resources Account contains $162 million to
support prospective new renewable electricity generation projects built in

See cf. id. See also Bryan Lee, Green Fees: Will consumers payfor environmentally
friendly power? In theory, yes; In practice, maybe not, Sept. 13, 1999, WALL ST. J., at
100

R12.
101 A.B. 1890 Article 7 § 381, 1996 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal 1996), LEXIS 1996 Cal ALS

854.
102

See Perkins, supra note 35, at 1024.

103

Cal. A.B. 1890 Article 7 § 381 (e).

104 Cal. Energy Comm'n, Renewable Energy Programs Overview, at http://www.energy.

ca'gov/renewables/renewables-fact-sheet.htnl (last visited Oct. 27, 2000).
105 CAL. ENERGY COMM'N, RENEWABLE ENERGY CONSUMER EDUCATION MARKETING

PLAN 3, (1999) [hereinafter MARKETING PLAN].
106 CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 381 (c) 1.
107 See California Energy Commission, Existing Renewable Resources Account, at http://
www.energy.ca.gov/renewables/existingrenewables.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2000).
108 See id.
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California after September 26, 1996.109 This fund works on a bid system
11°
in which bids are submitted for potential projects in an auction.
I
Winning bids can earn up to 1.5 cents per kilowatt-hour in incentives. '
At the first auction, fifty-five of the bids were determined to be eligible for
funding and the fund provided incentives for the creation of 300
megawatts of wind-powered electrical capacity, 157 megawatts of
geothermal generation facilities, 70 megawatts of landfill gas generation,
twelve megawatts of biomass generated energy, 1 megawatt of digester
gas, and 1 megawatt of small hydroelectrical generation.
The Emerging Renewable Resources Buy-Down Program
authorizes $54 million in rebates of as much as $3,000 per kilowatt/hour
residential, industrial, commercial or agricultural customers who purchase
and install a renewable electricity generation system." 3 In order to be
eligible, the system must be connected to the electric grid." t 4 This
program covers photovoltaics, small wind turbines, fuel cells and solar
thermal systems.
The Consumer Side Renewable Resources Account is desined to
provide an incentive for consumers to use renewable power. 16 It
earmarks $81 million to provide a 1.25 cent/kilowatt hour rebate for
customers who use recognized renewable resources.' 17 Only energy
generated in California by a non-utility generator is eligible for the
rebate." l8 Between the inception of the program in April 1998 and
December 1999, 1.79 million customers have received $13,081,923 in
rebates. " 9

109

See California Energy Commission, New Renewable Resources Account, at http://

www.energy.ca.gov/renewables/newrenewables.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2000).

110 See id.
I See id.
112

See id.

113

California Energy Commission, Emerging Renewables Buy-Down Program,at http://

www.energy.ca.gov/greengrid/index.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2000).
114

See id.

115

See id.

California Energy Commission, Customer CreditAccount, at http://www.energy.ca.
ov/greenpower/index.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2000).

116

118

Up until December 1999, the incentive was 1.5 cents per kilowatt/hour. See id.
See id.

119 California Energy Commission, HistoricalDatafor the Customer Credit Subaccount,
at http://www.energy.ca.gov/renewables/customer-credit-tablehtml (last visited Oct. 27,

2000).
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Finally, CPUC, under the auspices of Assembly Bill 1890 and
Senate Bill 90, started an education program, called the Renewable Energy
Consumer Education Plan (RECE).
The plan allocates a $5.4 million,
three-year budget.' 2 1 CPUC plans to begin by focusing on informing
potential "early adopters."' 2 2 Then, with a combination of word of mouth,
a grass roots organization, and a mass media campaign, CPUC hopes to
23
inform a broader base of potential customers.

VI.

ANALYSIS

A. Externalities
Environmentalists are concerned about the effects of restructuring
because "the market is not only inadequate to guide consumers' allocation
of resources in a way that advances the public goal of environmental
protection and least overall cost, it may, in some instances, guide the
investment and consumption in directions that damage the environment
and increase long-term cost.' 124
This is because environmental
consequences are often externalities, 125 and markets tend to ignore
26
negative externalities.'
Externalities in electrical energy generation, transmission and
distribution for example, include the loss of fisheries caused by the use of
a hydroelectric dam, and the environmental damages caused by burning
fossil fuels. 12 7 These externalities may lead to the "tragedy of the
commons," in which actors face an environmental incentive to misuse
collective property.' 28 Where negative externalities are unaccounted for,
"low-priced power may not be the same as low-cost power," because the

120 See MARKETING PLAN, supra note 105, at 3.
121 See id.
122 See id at 5.
123 See id.
124 Perkins, supra note 35, at 1033.

125

An externality occurs where the cost of an action is not born by the entity engaging in

that action. See Paul S. Kibel, National Incentives to Protect Natural Resources:
Preserving Their Plate in International Trade, 29 ENVTL. L. REP. 10411 (1999)

(discussing negative externalities).
26 See Perkins, supra note 35, at 1033.
See id. at 995.
128 Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 ScI. 1243 (1968) (arguing that

actors have incentives to waste or misuse community property).
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true costs are not included in the price. 129 Some of the causes of
externalities include: that consumers have limited knowledge, that
individuals use a short time frame to assess costs, that it is difficult to
diffused, and that many
price a problem that is geographically
13
uncertain.
are
harms
environmental
California attempted to solve the problem of environmental
externalities in providing consumers with knowledge and information
about the external costs by subsidizing and marketing renewable
resources,'31 and by forcing electricity generators to display a "power
content label" on mail and Internet advertising.' 32 If consumers know the
possible costs and benefits of their behavior they are able to make rational
decisions. 133 For this reason, information is a prerequisite for markets to
the market
run efficiently. 134 This type of mandatory labeling helps
'' 15
side-effects."
environmental
hidden
account for "otherwise
Despite labeling, one of the problems the California residential
market has encountered is false or misleading advertising relating to the
environmental quality of the energy provided. 36 In an attempt to deal
with misinformation, the Assembly passed Senate Bill 1305, which
requires generators to report consumption and fuel use figures to the
California Energy Commission (CEC). 137 The CEC may then certify a
generator's mix as renewable. 138 Oddly, the provisions of SB 1305 apply

129

See Perkins, supra note 35, at 993.

130 See id. at 1035.

See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
132 The label, which is based on FDA food labels, is designed to serve as a quick and
131

easy display for consumers to get information about the electricity they purchase.
California Energy Commission, California's Power Content Label, at http://www.
energy.ca.gov/consumer/power-contentlabel.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2000).
133 See LARRY N. GERSTON ET AL., THE DEREGULATED SOCIETY 32 (1988).
134 See Johnson, supra note 56, at 149.
135 Perkins, supra note 35, at 1038 ("Mandatory

electricity labeling, property done, is a

clear case of regulatory intervention helping achieve the optimal allocation of social
resources where the market itself would not have done so.").
136 See Jeff B. Slaton, note, Searching for "Green" Electrons in a Deregulated
Electricity Market: How Green is Green?, 22 - FALL ENVIRONS ENvTL. L. & POL'Y J. 21

1998).
37

S.B. 1305, 1997 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1997), LEXIS 1997 Cal ALS 796. See Lori

M. Rodgers, Green Electricity, It's in the Eye of the Beholder, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Aug.
1998, at 38 [hereinafter Eye of Beholder].
138 See id.
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39 and not to "advertisements and
only to potential and actual customers,1
40
media."'
notices in general circulation
One attempt at a solution to the problem of misleading advertising
came from the market. Center for Resource Solutions, a private non-profit
organization, established the Green-e logo.' 4' The Green-e logo was
based, on the popularity and success of the recycling logo. 142 A Green-e is
143
a way to verify that energy is renewable and environmentally clean.
The requirements for Green-e certification are: (1) at least 50 percent of
the electricity must be from renewable sources, (2) the electricity that is
not from renewable resources must be from sources with reduced emission
air pollutants, (3) the company generating the energy must sign a code of
conduct and release environmental information, (4) the company must
agree to undergo a review to ensure that their advertising contains no
misleading environmental information, and
(5) the company must agree to
44
a third-party audit to ensure compliance.1
California has made a step towards a cleaner environment by
informing customers of negative environmental externalities, but they do
not go far enough. Currently, generators are only required to disclose their
fuel mix or their percentage of electricity generated using renewable
resources. 45 A more complete plan would also include forced disclosure
of emissions. 146 Moreover, in order to assure an informed consumer base,
California should amend Senate Bill 1305 to remove the
exception for
147
"advertisements and notices in general circulation media."'

B. Beyond Externalities
However, even if the externalities are included in the cost of the
energy, significant environmental goals may still not be reached. One of
the major reasons is that each of these methods is designed to work on the
macro-level and do not deal with the distribution of wealth or the
139 See id.
140

Cal. SB 1305 § 398.4 (b).

141

Center for Resource Solutions, What is Green-e?, at http://www.green-e.org/what/

index.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2000).
142 See id.
143 See id.
144See
145

id.
See Lisa Prevost, Renewable Energy: Toward a Portfolio Standard?, PUB.

FORT., Aug.
146 See id.
147

1, 1998, at 30.

See Eye of Beholder,supra note 137, and accompanying text.
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distribution of pollution.
When there are gross disparities in wealth and
purchasing power between communities and nations, cost-benefit marketbased decision-making may distribute costs to the poor and benefits to the
wealthy. 149 This is, in part, because where the individuals harmed by the
pollution are dispersed or poor, they may not be in a position to bargain
with the polluter.150 In addition, a diverse group of individuals may have a
more difficult time gathering information and the transaction costs of
engaging in a legal battle may be prohibitive. 51 Finally, while the market
may under-compensate
poor human communities, it ignores non-human
152
communities.
C. Renewables in the New Market

Prior to restructuring, many environmentalists and utilities were
optimistic that, despite potentially higher costs, the green energy market
would still be competitive because industry, businesses, and residential
consumers would be willing to pay a premium for green energy.' 53 To
determine whether consumers are willing to pay a premium for green
electricity, it is important to look at the early
results of restructuring,
1 54
demand.
in
spike
a
caused
summer
hot
a
before
In the early days of restructuring, green energy appeared to have
become the most popular way to market energy. 1 5
Residential
competition in green power was described as "robust,"' 156 and price-based
competition as "not vigorous. 1 57 Energy service providers had difficulty
148 See Johnson, supra note 56, at 116.
149

See generally, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9,

1992.
150

See Johnson, supra note 56, at 156.

151

See id.

152

See AL GORE,

EARTH IN THE BALANCE

153See Lee, supra note

100.

189 (1992).

This is because "on a hot summer day California simply cannot round up enough
electricity to meet demand." See Brooks, supra note 91, at Al. Under such conditions
an electricity will fetch a high price.
15 See MARKETING PLAN, supra note 105, at 16 ("Given AB 1890's mandated 10
percent rate cut for residential customers of the IOUs over the next few years, 'greenness' is virtually the only distinguishing product variable affording ESPs [Energy Service
Providers] and entr&e to the residential market.").
156 Ryan Wiser, et al., California'sElectric Market: What's in it for the Customer,
PUB.
154

UTIL. FoRT., Aug. 1, 1998, at 38, 44.
157 Id. at 44.
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distinguishing their product based on cost alone.15 8 Therefore, one of the
only ways into the market was through "premium-priced, value-added
products" like green power.15 9 For these reasons, "green power" appeared
to be dominating advertising and marketing campaigns aimed at
160
residential markets prior to the energy crisis.
However, just because "green energy" is marketed does not mean
that the advertising was effective. 161 Consumer groups complained that
small businesses and residential customers were unable to take advantage
of restructuring. 162 Particularly perturbing to some is that while "green
energy" was extensively marketed, only around 1 percent of residential
customers switched electric providers.163 This caused the Ralph Nader-led
advocacy group, Public Citizen, to call the advantages of restructuring
"largely a hoax on consumers. ' 164 While some concern is warranted, it is
important to remember, "[i]t was never intended that the success of
California's market be gauged by the number of customers who have
' 65
'switched. ' "1
In fact, "the 'diffusion' of new products is rarely
immediate, but typically starts slowly before accelerating.' 66 The slow
pace of switching is comparable to the rate of switching after the breakup
167
of AT&T.
While the residential market remains untapped, more governmental, industrial, and business customers have switched to "green
power. 90 68 Santa Monica was one of the first cities to switch to green

158See

id. at 40.

159 bd. at 42.
160 See id. at 39.
161

See Mix of Jeers and Praisefor California'sFirstAnniversary of Retail Competition,

ELECTRIC UTIL. WK. 7 (1999), 1999 WL 12165320 [hereinafter Mix].
162

See id.

163 See id.
164

See Consumer Group Calls California's 'Green' Electricity A Hoax, Dow JONES

INT'L NEWS SERV., Oct. 22, 1998.
165 See Mix, supra note 161 (citing Californian's for Affordable & Reliable Electric

Services (CARES)).

166 Wiser, supra note 156, at 39.
167

See id. at 39, 40 ("In the first year after the 1984 breakup of the Bell system, for

example, AT&T's share of the interstate telephone market declined by less than 4
ercent, despite aggressive marketing on the part of its challengers.").
As of September 1999, around 16 percent of the industrial market had switched to
new electricity providers. See MARKETING PLAN, supra note 105, at 17.
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7
power.169 Chula Vista has followed, and San Diego may be on1 the way. 0
17
Large businesses that have switched include Time-Warner, Kinko's,172
and Los Angeles Airport (LAX), which signed an agreement with the Los
Angeles Department of Water and Power that will73 incrementally increase
"green power" to 50 percent over a ten-year span.'

The number of business and industrial customers switching to
green energy bodes well for the future of the renewable resources market
because as more consumers shift to "green energy," the price should drop,
and thus become more competitive.174 Early results suggested that
renewable resources might already be competitive: since restructuring,
California experienced extensive investment in "green energy," including
7
proposals for $1.5 billion in new clean and efficient power plants.
Before the summer price hikes, consumers were
able to buy green power
76
cheaper than power from older, dirtier sources.1
While the market in renewable resources seems strong, it is
difficult to assess the effect of the renewable resource incentives because
very few customers switched services and it is difficult to determine how
many, if any, customers switched to the renewable energy because of the
178
incentives. 77 Given that California has a $23 billion electric industry,
simple math suggests that $540 million in subsidies over four years would
not go very far, particularly when it cost 5.3 cents per kilowatt/hour for
renewable energy compared to 2.5 cents per kilowatt/hour to use coal or
169

See Michael Lohite, Santa Monica plans to buy all 'green' power, aims to set

example for nation, San Diego Union-Tribune, June 2, 1999, at A6.
170 See Lee, supra note 100.
171 See Press Release, Commonwealth Energy Procures "Green" Contract From Time
Warner Communications (Nov. 11, 1999), at http://www.powersavers.com/commonwealthnews/35press.htm.
172 See Press Release, Greenmountain.com Signs Kinko's For Cleaner Electricity:
Kinko's Leads Growing Business Trend, Supporting Renewable Energy by Switching to
a Cleaner Energy Service Provider (Oct. 5, 1999), at http://www.eren.doe.gov/greenower/knkos_ 1199_pr.html.
The airports contend that this shift will not cost the airport any money, but they have
budgeted $252,500 per year just in case. See Press Release, Los Angeles World Airports
Authorized to Sign 10-year Agreement with DWP to Purchase Green Power (Oct. 19,
1999), at http://www.lawa.orglhtml/LAWAshownews.asp?news=39.
174See

Lee, supra note 100, at R12 (citing Michael Feinstein, one of the Santa Monica

cit council members who voted for a "green energy" program).
715See Mix, supra note 161.
176 See Asmus, supra note 98.
177 See Mix, supra note 161.
178 See Noceto, supra note
46.
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oil.' 7 9 Still, the subsidies were designed only to "make 80
sure we didn't
throw out the baby with the bath water on the renewables."'
D. ConfirmingEnvironmentalBenefit
Even if energy is accurately marketed as "green," it may not
actually have a positive environmental impact.18 1 One of the unique
aspects of energy as a commodity is that it is indistinguishable-all
generators place electricity into the same transmission grid.18 2 Green
energy purchases may have no environmental impact "because the green
energy has already been sold" into the pool. 8 3 If the renewable energy
and the coal-based energy all go into the same pool, then how can
consumers determine if they are getting green energy? How can
consumers determine that the green energy will help the environment?
California found an elegant answer to the question in the structure
of the new electric industry, which combines a pool-co system with a
bilateral market. 184 A pool-co model serves as "an auctioneer, a power
dispatcher and a bill collector."' 8 5 Pool-co structures have been opposed
as "the very type of 'command and control' regulation which has
contributed so significantly to ...exorbitant electric rates."' 6 However,
pool-co 88is viewed more technically efficient 187 and fair than bilateral
trading.'
Bilateral trading, on the other hand, allows for direct contracts
between electricity generators and buyers. 189 This is based on the
179

See Hazel, supra note 99, at 139.

180

Joseph F. Schuler, Jr., Looking Back on Deregulation:FourStates Eight Views, PUB.

UTIL. FORT., Nov. 15, 1998, at 26 (citing CPUC Commissioner P. Gregory Conlon).
181 See Slaton, supra note 136, at 29.
182 See Asmus, supra note 98.
183 See Slaton, supra note 136, at 29.
114 See infra p. 10.
185 Peter Navarro, A Guidebook and Research Agenda for Restructuring the Electricity
Industry, 16 ENERGY L.J. 347, 389 (1995) [hereinafter Guidebook]. Note, however, that
this model assumes the existence only of an ISO. California has the Power Exchange
(PX) operate as the auctioneer and bill collector while the ISO serves as a distributor.
See supra notes 84-85.
186 See id. at 390.
187

Unlike bilateral trading, a pool-co may allow for a more efficient use of transmission

lines. See id. 389.
188 Pool-co systems will "substantially reduce the gap between the average cost and
marginal price that might otherwise occur" with bilateral trading. See id. at 390.
189 See id. at 381.
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"fiction" that the same energy a buyer purchases will be delivered through
the transmission lines. 19° Bilateral trading is controversial, in part,
because it "purports to create a point-to-point contract path for
transmission, ignoring the dynamics of grid physics."' 191 Professor Charles
Koch describes it elegantly: "the results of these characteristics can be
envisioned by considering a person in Spain buying a cup of water from
someone in the United States. The person in the United States must
deliver the water by dropping it into the Atlantic Ocean; the purchaser dips
a cup of water out of the ocean."'1 92 Most significantly, bilateral trading
has been criticized as "unfair" to small consumers and residential
93
customers. 1
This hybrid system should allow consumers to reap the benefits of
both models, but "California's creation of a separate ISO and PX, with
mandatory use of a scheduling coordinator to schedule bilateral contracts
with the ISO, is more complex than what most states are trying."' 194 The
complexity provides benefits, as consumers will get the fairness of a pool95
co system and the "fiction" of direct contacts.1
The California model provides increased fairness compared to
bilateral trading alone, because bilateral trading provides a system in
which larger consumers will be able to take advantage of the greater
bargaining power and receive better prices. 19 6 Such a system may
exacerbate environmental injustices because "in a free market, lowincome communities will never have sufficient financial resources to buy
clean air, clean water, and similar environmental and public healthy
resources from wealthy communities or polluters."' 97 The California
190

See id. at 381-382.

191

Id. at 387.

192

Charles Koch, Control and Governance of Transmission Organizations in the

RestructuredElectric Industry (forthcoming 2000).

customers will have more bargaining power and "more resources to fathom the
market" and thus "better access to bargains than smaller customers." Guidebook, supra
note 185, at 388.
193Large

194

Eve of Competition, supra note 77, at 31.

See Guidebook, supra note 185, at 394-95 (discussing the "[p]ros and [c]ons" of such
a hybrid system).
196 See id. at 388. But see, Hazel, supra note 94, at 140 (arguing that
industrial
195

customers, usually large consumers of electricity, have benefited more than residential
customers from deregulation).

Johnson, supra note 56, at 119-120 (arguing "environmental law developed and
flourished precisely because economic theory, and the free market, did not address those
social concerns").
197
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system, by including pool-co characteristics allows for more transparent
98
prices, and therefore more fairness, than a solely direct access system.1
The hybrid also allows for the "fiction" of direct contacts through
bilateral trading. The bilateral trading component of the California
restructuring plan allows customers to know what they are paying for,
rather than what they are getting. 199 A marketer selling "green energy"
can purchase energy from the power exchange (pool) or directly from a
generator. Energy bought from the Power Exchange is designated the
"California Power mix," and does not count as "green energy" for
California (or green-e) certification. 200 Only a direct purchase from a
generator that is verified as green by the State of California counts towards
"green energy" certification. 20 1 While consumers can never know that
they are consuming energy that was generated using renewable resources,
consumers can be certain they are paying "green energy" companies to
generate power. 202 Because this system makes bilateral trades with green
energy generators a commodity, it also encourages further investment in
green energy generation facilities.
This system is not perfect. According to the 1999 Power Content
Label, 12 percent of the electricity sold to the power exchange was
generated using "eligible renewables." 20 3 What is to stop marketers from
purchasing renewable energy, which would have otherwise been sold into
the pool, and selling it for a premium?
The best solution is to institute a "renewable portfolio standard." A
renewable portfolio standard is a market-based approach that is similar in
design to the federal sulfur-dioxide trading program. 204 A renewable
portfolio standard establishes an across the board minimum amount of
electricity that must be generated from renewable resources. 20 5 Generators
receive a credit for each kilowatt/hour of renewable energy sold to the
pool, and can
sell those credits to generators who do not reach the
20 6
minimum.
198 See Guidebook, supra note 185, at 390.
199See California'sPower Content Label, supra note 132.
200 See id.
201 The California Power Exchange verifies trades. See id.
202 See id.

203 See id.
204 See Prevost supra note 145, at 30.
205 See id.
206 See id. at 30-31 (quoting American Wind Energy Association executive director
Randall Swicher as saying "credits are central to the concept if you are intending to
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Each state would have a difficult problem setting the initial
percentage. If the percentage is too high, it could be difficult for green
marketers to distinguish their product.2 If the percentage is too low, it
fails to protect renewable resources. I believe that the solution is to set the
initial percentage slightly below the status quo, to ensure that renewable
20 8
resources do not switch from the pool.
Renewable portfolio standards have three significant problems:
they may be expensive, they may be unconstitutional, and they may be
unfair to in-state businesses.
First, renewable portfolio standards may be expensive. 209 Critics
have estimated that federal renewable portfolio standards would increase
costs by somewhere between 15 cents to 7 dollars a month per residential
customer. 21 Most of the studies suggest that the increase in costs would
be "minimal."2 1 ' These analyses may be flawed because the studies fail to
account for risk.212 Because renewable resources have relatively stable
year-to-year costs, the renewable resources are less financially risky than
fossil fuel generators. 213 Including a low-risk, but higher-cost investment
in a portfolio is a well-established way to maximize investments-similar
214
to the stabilizing effect treasury bonds have on an investment portfolio.
Because of the positive effect renewable resources have on risk, a
215
portfolio in renewable resources may actually reduce overall costs.

encourage compliance and encourage a market for these technologies through privatesector decision making").
207 See id. at 36 (arguing a renewable standard set close to "what the market will achieve
on its own will make it easy for every energy provider to look green" making green

lpower "a much tougher sell").

For California, the figure would need to be set near 12 percent according to 1998
figures. See California'sPower Content Label, supra note 132.
See Prevost, supra note 145, at 32-34.
210 See id.
211

See Shimon Awerbuch, Getting It Right: The Real Cost Impacts of a Renewables

Porfolio Standard,PuB. UTIL. FoRT. Feb. 15, 2000, at 44.
212See
213

id. at 45 (arguing that renewable resources are "devoid" of systematic risk).

See id. at 50.

See id. at 45 (arguing that renewable resources are like government T-bills which
"improve efficiency. They raise expected returns at any given level of risk, even though
214

their own expected return is lower").
215

See id. ("Portfolio theory tell us that when properly constructed . . . [a portfolio

consisting of] riskless renewables serves to lower overall generating costs.")
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Renewable portfolio standards may also pose a constitutional
problem. 2 16 Most significantly, if a renewable portfolio standard applied
to out-of-state generators, it may be constitutionally impermissible
because of the dormant commerce clause.217 A renewable portfolio
standard that applies just to in-state businesses, however, may be
permissible as long as the program applies only to in-state businesses and
only requires a mix of renewable energy, rather than attempting to set
prices. 2 18 Unfortunately, if a renewable portfolio standard applies only to
in-state businesses, it may be unfair.219 Because in-state businesses would
have to bear the financial burden of a renewable portfolio standard, the
generated electricity could rise and become less
prices of in-state
220
competitive.
I believe that the benefits of a renewable energy portfolio would
outweigh the costs because consumers would be assured that the demand
for renewable energy results in investment in new facilities, not merely a
shifting of renewable resources away from the power pool.
VII. CONCLUSION

As states struggle to undo almost eighty years of state regulation
and restructure their electrical utility industries, the potential
environmental consequences of deregulation pose a significant problem.
Electrical generation is a major emitter of various dirty gasses. The
market poses two significant environmental problems: the market may not
effectively include the costs of negative environmental externalities into
the price of electricity, and the deregulation may pose a threat to the
renewable resources industry.
California attempted to account for negative environmental
externalities by a program of mandatory labeling, which would require
216

See Steven Ferrey, Renewable Subsidies in the Age of Deregulation, PUB. UTIL.

FoRT., Dec. 1997, at 26-27 (contending that some portfolio standards may be
unconstitutional while others may be permissible).
217 A state may not impose a levy on the sales of goods or services sold through interstate

commerce inorder to subsidize in-state industries. See id. at 24.
218
219

See id.
See Prevost, supra note 145, at 35-36 (discussing the similar negative effect on

competition in a deregulated environment of states having different air standards for

electric generators).
220 See cf Prevost, supra note 145, at 35-36 (citing New Jersey Public Service Electric
and Gas Co. Vice President Tony Borden who stated "we don't think it's fair for other

utilities to just grind it up a few notches on the output of their plants and send that power
here when they don't have to meet the standards we do").
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disclosure of a seller's electric mix. However, the California labeling
program is incomplete because labeling is not required in mass media
advertisements and because the program was limited only to fuel mix, and
excluded emissions. Although mandatory labeling will help to incorporate
externalities into price, merely including externalities will not solve the
more troublesome problems of unfair distribution of pollution.
California attempted to foster a market in renewable energy by
creating a $540 million, four-year renewable resource subsidy, certifying
green energy, and implementing an inventive hybrid restructuring system
that allows for both pool-based and bilateral trading. The unique hybrid
structure allows customers to know that the money they put into green
energy would go to renewable energy generators while minimizing
distributional unfairness. Unfortunately, early results were mixed. While
companies were vigorously marketing renewable "green energy," very
few residential customers switched to a new supplier. However,
decreasing prices for green energy, the brisk pace of industrial switching
and investments in renewable technology suggest a bright future.
Unfortunately, California failed to deal with one important
problem, the possibility that consumers could pay for green energy
without affecting the percentage of the electrical market that consists of
renewable resources. To ensure that demand for green energy results in
new investments in renewable technology, states should implement a
hybrid system similar to California's, but with a renewable portfolio
standard that would require that a certain percentage of the energy sold
into the pool consists of renewable resources. A state with a strong
mandatory labeling requirement, a carefully built hybrid restructuring
system, carefully constructed short-term subsidies, and a renewable
portfolio standard will go a long way towards minimizing the
environmental consequences of electrical electricity deregulation.

